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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

5

RUTH S. HILTSLEY, Personally and
RUTH S. HILTSLEY/ administratrix
of the Estate of Milton J. Hiltsley/
7 aka M.J. Hiltsley/
Plaintiff/

6

8

vs.
9

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
HALLALENE M. RYDER/

10

Case No. 870377
Defendant.

II
12 Estate of Etta Wood/ by her personal

representative/ Douglas P. Simpson/

13

Intervenor/Appellant.

14
15
16
17

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Intervenor appeals from a final Order of the Third Judicial
District Court/ Judge Dennis Frederick/ granting a summary judgment
to Defendant and denying summary judgment to Intervenor.

The

18

basic dispute between Hiltsley, plaintiff/ and Ryder/ defendant/
19
20

has been before this Court on a prior occasion and a decision was
made on June 10/ 1987 reversing the judgment.

The language of

21

this Court in its decision reads as follows:

22

court should have required that Etta Wood's estate be joined before

23

deciding the case as it did/ we reverse the case and remand for

"Because the trial

-2-

joinder of Etta Wood's estate."

The remittitur from the Supreme

2 I Court was filed with the County Clerk of Salt Lake County on
July 10/ 1987.

On July 20/ 1987/ the personal representative of

the estate of Etta Wood was ordered joined as a party plaintiff.
On July 30/ 1987 the Complaint in Intervention was filed in the
Third Judicial District Court.
August 17/ 1987.

Answer of Respondent was filed on

Intervenor, on the 21st of August/ 1987/ filed

7

a Motion for Summary Judgment with Memorandum in support of the

8

motion.

q

September 4, 1987.

10

Respondent filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
The matter was duly argued and submitted and

the Court/ on September 14/ 1987/ granted Respondent's Cross-Motion|
for Summary Judgment and denied Intervenor/Appellant's Motion for

II

Summary Judgment.
12

This matter is now before the Court on Intervenor's appeal
13
14

from the trial court's order.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

15

Intervenor seeks reversal of the trial court judgment and

16

for judgment that the sums determined by Judge Croft as held in

17

trust amounting to $43/623.43 be determined by the Court to be
assets of the estate of Etta Wood and for judgment accordingly.

18
STATEMENT OF FACTS
19
Intervenor/Appellant in this matter/ pursuant to the order
20
21

of this Court/ filed her Complaint in Intervention.
representative then moved for summary judgment.

The personal

The motion was

22 I based upon the ground that the matter in issue as to the ownership
23

of the assets of the estate of Etta Wood was a basic issue tried

-3-

by Judge Croft in the original action between Hiltsley and Ryder,
9

I Judge Croft/ in his memorandum opinion/ states as follows:

3 |
4 |
^ I
"

It seems clear to me that Milton must be considered
as having received that $30/000.00 in trust for Etta
and this money was not his money to invest as he did
and did not become his upon her death to give away
or use for his own purposes.
It is thus apparent
that at least $10/000.00 each of the three accounts
mentioned came from Etta's funds. (Tr. 53)
The document which supports the trial court finding was

7

introduced without objection from any party.

8

of the deceased Milton J. Hiltsley (Ex.10).

g\

pages in which Milton Hiltsley refers to Etta Wood's estate.

10
II
12
13

14 I
15 |
16
17

18 |
19
20
2'I

It is the journal
There are three

Page 250 contains the following notations:
For Etta: accounting
9/19 - Ck to Public Service of New Mexico for
utilities
9.68
9/24 - Transferred ace to Tracy Collins
2,000.00
Deposited
409.71
Transferred
2,409.91
9/24 - Check cash for running exp to hosp.
75.00
$147.47 bal in New Mexico checking
9/28 - Am. Savings to bring savings from
New Mexico.
Page 253 dated October 5/ 1979 reads as follows:
10/5/79 - Received money from Etta's account
transferred to Salt Lake from Albuquerque/
N.M. 30,000.00 + 314.00 - a shortage of 8.+.
The Am. Savings will check this shortgage for me.
Placed $10,000.00 in savings pass book
"
$10,000.00 in money market at A.M. Savings
"
$10,000.00 in money mkt @ P.F.S.
Neither party to the original action questioned the

22 J authenticity of these entries in the Milton J. Hiltsley journal.
23

Page 262 reads as follows:

-4-

| J
9

I

3 I
4 |
5
6

7
3
9

Etta died on January 20, 1980 - 9:30 P.M. She was
buried at Santa Fe, New Mexico on January 23/ 1980
at 2 P.M. a graveside service,
A small but very nice service and burial. The same
type stone as Alton's, is to be placed on her grave*
Air fare
480-00
Mortician
1260.68
Flowers
15.00
Head stone
143.68
Telephone
11.25
Meals @ Santa Fe
15.00
2025.61

There was no evidence contrary to the written exhibit.

At

no place in the journal is there any claim of Milton Hiltsley or
the defendant that these funds were theirs by reason of gift or
other transfer from Etta Wood during her lifetime.

10

Judge Croft traced the three $10/000.00 deposits through
II

the bank accounts and entered judgment that defendant pay the
12
13

personal representative of Etta Wood $10/000.00 with interest
from the first of November/ 1979.

This sum was invested on

14 J November 1/ 1979 in the condo purchased by Milton Hiltsley and
15 I Hallalene Ryder.
16
17

Judge Croft determined that an account No. 11-0132799 at
American Savings & Loan contained Etta's funds.

August 25/ 1981/

the day before his death/ deceased placed the name of Hallalene
18
Ryder on the account as joint tenant.
19

The third $10/000.00 was traced by Judge Croft into Account

20

No. 003-300/723-6 at Prudential Federal Savings & Loan.

21

Defendant Hallalene Ryder's name was also on this account as a

22 I

joint tenant.

23

On the death of Milton Hiltsley/ the funds were in Account

This deposit was traced through several accounts.

-5-

|

No. 715-101,422-2 at Prudential Federal Savings & Loan.

It

stood in the name of Milton J. Hiltsley and Hallalene Ryder as
joint tenants.
Following Hiltsley's death/ without the deposit certificate/
Hallalene Ryder withdrew the balance in the account of $18/363.65.
Transfer was made by the bank in reliance upon an Affidavit and
6

Guarantee for Lost Evidence of Account/ Exhibit 30-P/ signed by

7

defendant.

g
y

.
J

10 |

12
13

She swore that the following was true:

I/We Hallalene Ryder and Milton J. Hiltsley (Deceased)
being duly sworn on my/our oath(s)/ do hereby declare
and represent that I am/we are the owner(s) of Savings
Passcard/Passbook/Certificate of Account No. 715-101422-2
issued by PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
hereinafter designated ASSOCIATION, of Salt Lake City,
Utah/ on or about the 4th day of September/ 1981 that
I/we have not in any way disposed of said Passcard/
Passbook/Certificate or of our interest therein; that
said Passcard/Passbook/Certificate has been lost/
misplaced or destroyed/ and I am/we are unable to
produce the same.
The money market certificate which represented the Prudential

14
Federal Savings & Loan account was found by plaintiff in a secret
15
tin box hiding place after Milton J. Hiltsley's death (see Finding
16
17 1

No. 18, Tr. 9 2 ) .
Trial court found that at the time of the Affidavit (Ex. 30),

18

defendant knew that the certificate of deposit was in the

19

possession of plaintiff (see Finding No. 21 of Findings of Fact,

20

Tr. 93). Court found also that the co-owner of the certificate,
one Fred Hansen/ claims no contribution to the account and that

21
his name was on the account as an accommodation to defendant and
22
at her request (see Findings of Fact No. 20/ Tr. 93).
23

-6-

Judge Croft's Findings of Fact are based on evidence which
was not disputed by any contrary evidence.
2

INTERVENOR PLEADINGS

3

Intervener's Complaint in Intervention makes claim on the

4 J assets that were determined by Judge Croft to be assets which
5

came from Etta Wood.
The Complaint alleges that during the lifetime of Milton J.

6

Hiltsley he had a confidential relationship with Etta Wood/ his
7

sister/ and handled for her and on her behalf her assets which
8
9
10

were in his possession (Par. 4, Complaint in Intervention/ Tr.
590).

These allegations

are not disputed.

In the Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Cross-Motion
for Summary Judgment/ defendant recites as uncontroverted facts

12 I the appointment of Ruth S. Hiltsley as personal representative
13

of Milton J. Hiltsley/ the fact that she/ in her representative
capacity and personally/ brought the original action against

14
defendant.
15

She sets forth several of the findings of Judge Croft

including paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Findings and paragraphs 1 and

16

2 of this court's decision.

17

the Findings of Judge Croft contained in paragraph 20 (Tr. 93)

She cites also as uncontroverted

18 J relating to present state of the Prudential Federal Savings &
19 J Lean account.
20
21

Judge Croft signed his judgment on March 29/ 1983.

Defendant recites also that it is uncontroverted that Judge Croft
ordered the defendant to pay the estate of Etta Wood the
$10/000.00 represented by a contribution to the purchase price

22

of defendant's condo and that the trial court then ordered
23

defendant to pay the American Savings & Loan Association

-7-

| J Certificate No. 11-013277-9 and the Prudential Federal Savings &
Loan Association Account No. 003-300,723-6 to Etta Wood's estate.
Plaintiff was granted judgment for $4,924.66/ her share of
a tenancy in common account which she did not sign off.
It is undisputed that the trial court awarded defendant an
American Savings & Loan passbook account on which she was a joint
°

tenant with Milton J. Hiltsley.

7

Etta Wood/ a sister of Milton J. Hiltsley, died on January 20, 19801

8

and that Douglas P. Simpson was appointed her personal representative

9

on May 25, 1983.

10

It was uncontroverted also that

A fact not admitted as uncontroverted by defendant is the
following findings by Judge Croft:

12 I
13

Thus it would appear that the total amounts in these
two accounts, together with the $10,000 used on the
condominium purchase, would all have to be considered
as funds which decedent held in trust for Etta Wood
at the time of her death and such would be subject to
probate as part of Etta Woodfs estate. (Tr. 94)

14

In Finding No. 16, subparagraph (d), Court found that the
15

sum of $9,849,32, part of a tenancy in common account, was to be
16
17

divided between the tenants in common, Ruth Hiltsley and deceased/
each having an interest of $4,924.66 (Tr. 90). The Court

18 I concluded that Ruth Hiltsley should be awarded in her individual
19 J capacity the sum of $4,924.66, one-half of the tenancy in common
20
21

balance invested in defendant's condo(Tr. 94, Conclusion 1).
Conclusions of Law then allocated to the estate of Etta Wood
$10,000.00 out of the investment in the condominium (Par. 2,

22

Conclusions).
23

The balance

in the account at American Savings &

Loan, 11-013277-9, and Account No. 003-300723-6 at Prudential

-8-

Federal Savings & Loan (Conclusions/ Tr. 96).
It is undisputed that this Court in its decision/ after
2

accurately reciting the Findings by the trial court/ then
3

determined that because the estate of Etta Wood was not a party/
4
5

the trial court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the
estate of Etta Wood.

6

This Court then ordered:

7 J
8

Because the trial court should have required that
Etta Wood's estate be joined before deciding the
case as it did/ we reverse the case and remand for
joinder Etta Wood's estate.

9

in Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion/ he/ while

10

12
13

concurring in the result/ states:
I would advise the trial court that it erred in
finding a constructive trust on the state of the
facts before it.
The Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendant in
the trial court stated that the motion was upon the ground that

14
there was no material issue of fact and defendant was entitled to
15
16

judgment as a matter of law and that the motion was based upon
the pleadings and the Memorandum in Support of the Cross-Motion

17 I (R. 614-615).
18
19
20

The Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment/ after reciting some of the uncontroverted facts,
under points and
authority:

authorities/ sets forth as its point and

Intervenor's Claims are Barred by the Statute of

21

Limitations.
22
23

The position is that the statute of limitations

started to run on May 25/ 1983/ the day of the appointment of
Intervenor as personal representative.

It further appears that

-9-

her position is that from May 25, 1983 until July 29, 1987, a
period of four years and two months elapsed, and therefore the
Intervener's claim was barred (Tr. 611-12).
LEGAL ARGUMENT
POINT I.
5 I
6 J

SECTION 78-12-40, U.C.A. GRANTS
INTERVENOR A YEAR IN WHICH TO
FILE HER COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION

The statute on which parties both rely is Section 78-12-40,
U.C.A., which is entitled "Effect of failure of action not on

7
8§
9 |
10 I

merits".

It reads as follows:

If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff
fails in such action or upon a cause of action otherwise
than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law
or contract for commencing the same shall have expired,
the plaintiff/ or if he dies and the cause of action
survives, his representatives, may commence a new action
within one year after the reversal or failure.

12
This Court has on two separate occasions interpreted the
13
meaning of the statute and applied it to cases before it.
14

The

first case is Thomas v. Braffet's Heirs, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d

15

507 (1956).

This was an action in which various parties sought

16 J to quiet title to land in Uintah County.

Some of the parties had

17 I not joined in the action as plaintiffs but were named as defendant*
This Court, in unanimous opinion, held as follows concerning

18

proper interpretation of 78-12-40;

19
20 |
2| |
9~

.
'

Plaintiffs maintain that this statute by its express
terms extends the statute of limitations only to
'plaintiffs', and that it cannot be invoked by
defendants. We think, however, that the purpose
behind the statute is plain and that the legislature
intended that anyone who had a cause in litigation
which was dismissed for some reason 'otherwise than
u
P ° n t h e merits' should have a reasonable time, which

the

-10-

2 I
3 |
4 I
^ '

is set as one year/ to reassert and attempt to establish
his rights in court. There is no reason to believe
that the legislature had any disposition to favor
'plaintiffs1 over any other class of litigants. We
think that the word 'plaintiff as used in this section
was meant to include not only the party who brings
the action/ but any party who affirmatively seeks
relief/ as did the defendants here/ in this and the
prior action.
In the case at bar/ Intervenor/ while not a party to the

6 I original action/ was a person whose claim was adjudicated and
7 I for whom the trial court granted substantial
8
9

rights.

As is clear from a reading of Thomas v. Braffet's Heirs/
supra/ the word "plaintiff" should not be given a restrictive
interpretation but should include any party who affirmatively

10
seeks relief in this or in the prior action.
II
12

The Intervenor in

this action/ during the time before the statute of limitations
had expired/ filed her petition with this court to be joined in

13 J the action as an intervenor.

The motion was filed on June 30/

14 I 1983 in the Utah supreme Court and was denied September 19/ 1983,
15
16

It is clear then that Intervenor appeared and sought the
relief granted her by Judge Croft prior to the time that the
statute of limitations had run.

17
A general principle of law seems to be that these statutes
18

which toll the running of the statute of limitations are to be

19

liberally construed in order to accomplish the purpose of the

20

statute.

211

45 NM406, 115 P.2d 627, 148 ALR 722.

22

Mexico Supreme Court is as follows:

23

See 51 Am Jur 2d/ Sec. 143/ page 714/ Re Goldsworthy/
The language of the New

-11-

2
3 |

We see no cogent reason to strive to discover a
contrary legislative intent. In the first place/
the law favors right of action rather than the right
of limitation. Gresham v. Talbot/ 326 Mo 517/ 31
SW2d 766. Therefore/ a statute which tolls the
statute of limitations should be liberally construed
in order to accomplish that purpose.

4 "
The United States Supreme Court in American Pipe &

5

Construction Co. v. Utah/ 94 Sup Ct 765/ 414 U.S. 538/ 38 L.ed.2d

6

713/ ruled that persons who were in a class were entitled to

7

proceed after a class action had been dismissed upon the grounds

8

that the number of parties in the class were not sufficiently

9

large.

10

The Court held members of the class could bring their

individual suits after the statutory period had expired.

The

case set forth public policy concerning statutes of limitations
generally.

12
13
14 j

15 [

Headnote 9 states as follows:

Statutory limitation periods are designed to promote
justice by preventing surprises through revival of
claims that have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost/ memories have faded and
witnesses have disappeared. Clayton Act/ Sec. 4B/
5(b), 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 15b, 16(b).
Recent cases have followed the Supreme Court ruling.

16 !
A number of cases have permitted the limitation to be
'' I tolled where a wrong party was sued in the very beginning by the
18 I plaintiff.
19

See Cox v. Ohio Parole Commission/ 31 Ohio App.3d

216/ 509 N.E.2d 1276 (1986), an action filed aginst individual

„ I members of the Parole Commission.
Parole Commission.

Proper defendant was the

There the Ohio Supreme Court held:

21;

22 |
23 |

Moreover/ the savings statute is remedial in nature
and is to be given a liberal construction. See
Cero Realty Corp. v. American Mfrs. Mutl. Ins. Co./
(1960), 171 Ohio St. 82, 12 0.0.2d 92, 167 N.E.2d 774.

-12-

I

See, also/ Chadwick v. Barba Lou/ Inc«/ (1982)/
69 Ohio St.2d 222/ 23 0.0.3d 232/ 481 N.E.2d 660.
Pay Surgicals/ Inc. v. State Tax Commission/ 469 N.Y.S.2d

3

262 (1983)/ recites that the tolling statutes are designed to

4

ensure the right of a litigant who diligently seeks recourse in

5

the courts.

6

narrow construction.

7

291 A.2d 1126, 40 Conn. Sup. 266; Bradley v. Burnett/ 687 S.W.2d

8

The broad purpose of the statute would be aborted by
See/ also/ Morrissey v. Board of

Education/

53.
The Intervenor here/ as soon as the facts became known

9

about the disposition of the assets of the estate of Etta Wood/

10 J made every effort to assert its claim against defendant.

The

personal representative was promptly appointed and a Motion to
12

Intervene was filed by him in this court.

13

defendant was apprised of plaintiff's position.

14

of Judge Croft was even more effective in giving to defendant

15
16

From that time on/
The decision

notice of the interest of the estate of Etta Wood in assets
passed from Milton Hiltsley/ deceased/ to the defendant.

This court interpreted 78-12-40 in the case of Dunn v. Kelly
I7| 675 P.2d 571 (Utah 1983). The facts in the Dunn case are clearly
18 J distinguishable from the present facts.
ip
20

In the Dunn case/ a

reported child had filed an action through his guardian ad litem.
During the proceedings it was discovered that said child was not
the child of the deceased and the court dismissed his action.

21

Subsequent to the time that the statute of limitations had run/
22
23

plaintiff there was appointed personal representative.

He then

filed an action to obtain damages for all of the heirs of the

-13-

I

deceased Nelson Dunn/ Jr.

This court held that there was no legal

relationship between the original plaintiff Brandunn Waiters
and the plaintiffs.

there was no right to claim the benefits of

the statute tolling the time because of the case filed by a
guardian ad litem.
£ I
u

6

Intervenor respectfully submits that the statute of
limitations has not run and should not be made a bar to its action

7 I for assets which were clearly and properly the assets of Etta Wood1
8

estate.
POINT II.

9

THE CLEAR EVIDENCE CONVINCED THE
TRIAL COURT THAT A CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUST EXISTED.

10
The majority opinion of this court did not discuss the
II

question of whether or not a constructive trust of the Wood

12

assets in the hands of Hiltsley had been properly determined by

13

Judge Croft.

However/ in the concurring opinion of Justice

14 I Zimmerman/ it appears that he had some question as to whether or
15

not the evidence presented to Croft was sufficient to establish

16

the relationship of trustee and trustor between Hiltsley and Wood.

17

(Pg 1026, 738 P.2d).
The facts relating to the relationship between Hiltsley and

18
Wood are undisputed.
19
20

Relevant to consideration of the constructiv<

trust are the following facts:
(1)

On October 5/ 1979/ Hiltsley received from his sister,

211 Wood, $30,000.00.

At that time. Wood was in Salt Lake City/

22 I either in the hospital or at Hiltsley's home (R. 89/ Croft
„,

Finding No. 15)

-14-

(2)

Etta Wood died on January 20/ 1980.

(3)

Wood was Hiltsley's sister.

(4)

Hiltsley managed Wood's affairs after she came to Salt

Lake City from Albuquerque/ New Mexico.

Hiltsley acted as Woodfs

representative/ paid her funeral bills/ and kept an account of
5 I her burial expenses (see pgs 250/ 253/ 262 of Exhibit 10).
6

(5)

7

Judge Croft found that it was clear that Hiltsley

received the $30/000.00 from Etta Wood in trust for her (Finding
No. 25, R. 94).

8

(6)

Ryder makes no claim that any of the funds in the

9

accounts where Hiltsley deposited Wood money came from her
10

resources.

II

Footnote 5 of the opinion of this court Hiltsley v. Ryder,

12

738 P.2d 1024/ pg 1026/ states as follows:

13 J
14 J
15

In making this disposition/ we in no way rule upon
the merits of the constructive trust issue. To do
so would be improper since the record was developed
without representation by Etta Wood's estate. However/
for the benefit of the trial court/ we refer it to
Ashton v. Ashton/ 733 P.2d 147/ 151-52 (Utah 1987),
and Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 636-37 (Utah 1984).

16
The trial court, in determining the summary judgment issues/
17

apparently did not consider the questions of constructive trust

18

and the cases cited in Footnote 5.

19

Since the facts relating to

the establishment of a trust were found by Judge Croft to exist

20 I and the relevant facts are undisputed/ it appears to Intervenor
2| J that this is a matter that is a question of law only for the
99

- court to decide.
In the cases cited in Footnote 5/ the relevant facts

23 "

•15-

|

relating to the establishment of constructive trust were before

2

this court in a different scenario/ but nevertheless the court's
decision/ Intervenor believes/ is pertinent and relevant to her
rights and the case now before this court.
In Ashton v. Ashton/ 733 P.2d 147/ the relationship was
that of brothers.
brother.

The constructive trust was imposed upon a

There were the rights of a joint tenant to be considered

7

by the court.

8

on oral or documentary evidence/ shall not be set aside unless

n

clearly erroneous/ and due regard shall be given to the opportuni

10

The court held:

"Findings of fact/ whether based

of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."
This quote is from Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a).

II

It is Intervenor's position that Judge Croft's decision was
12

not clearly erroneous when he determined that Hiltsley held the
13
14

assets of Wood in trust.
Defendant/ as far as Intervener is able to determine/ has

15 J never attempted to make a showing that the trial court's Findings
16
17

of Fact were "clearly erroneous".
The majority opinion then sets forth the law concerning
constructive trusts and cites the numerous authorities in

Utah

18

which have supported establishment of such trusts.

See Footnote

19

6/ 733 P.2d 150/ which reads as follows:
20

22 1

See, e.g./ In re Estate of Hock/ 655 P„2d 1111/
1115 (Utah 1982); Carnesecca v. Carnesecca/ 572
P.2d 708, 710, (Utah 1977); Hawkins v. P~erry,
123 Utah 16, 23, 253 P.2d 372, 375 (1953); Haws-v.
Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 216, 209 P.2d 229, 231 (1949).

23

Ashton v. Ashton also sets forth the sections of the

21

-16-

Restatement of Trusts and then reconciled the language of that
2

section with the court's rulings in Park v. Zions First National
Bank/ 673 P.2d 590 (1983)/ where the court had occasion to

3

construe and compare the language of the Restatement of Trusts/
4
5

6 J
7 |
g I
^

10

12 |
13 J

14

Section 442/ and the Restatement of Restitution/ Section 160.
In Park the court held:
Section 160 presents the broadest possible
application of a constructive trust. It provides
that a constructive trust may arise 'where a person
holding title to property is subject to an equitable
duty to convey it to another on the ground that he
would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to
retain it . . .'
Such breadth has also been
described as follows:
Constructive trusts include all those instances
in which a trust is raised by the doctrines of
equity for the purpose of working out justice
in the most efficient manner/ where there is no
intention of the parties to create such a relation/
and in most cases contrary to the intention of
the one holding the legal title/ and where there
is no express or implied/ written or verbal/
declaration of the trust.
In Parks v. Zions First National Bank/ a material difference

15

is that the relationship was that of husband and wife rather than

16

brother and sister.

17

and there is a transfer of property/ courts have held that a

18

gift may be presumed.

Where a husband and wife relationship exists

However/ where the relationship is that

of brother and sister, no such presumption arises.
19

In Ashton v. Ashton/ the court finally determined that the
20
21

trust existed on the

transfer from

brother to brother which

bound the joint tenant of the trustee, in that instance his wife,

22

and imposed a trust on the assets transferred by a deceased

23

brother.

-17-

The other case cited by the court in the decision on this
matter is Baker v. Pattee/ 684 P.2d 632.
a trust was determined not to exist.

In Baker v. Pattee/

The question of whether or

not a confidential relationship existed/ however/ was discussed
and the language of the court/ Intervenor submits/ is especially
^

applicable to the relationship that existed between Hiltsley/

6

the minister/ and Wood/ his sister.

7 J
oJ
1

^ J
10 |
|| |
12
13
14 |
15 I
16

This court stated:

[12/ 13] A confidential relationship is presumed
between parent and child/ attorney and client/ and
trustee and cestui que trust. Blodgett v. Martsch/
Utah, 500 P.2d 298 (1978). The same holds true
between a spiritual advisor and a dying man.
Corporation of the Members of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Watson/ 25 Utah 45/
69 P.531 (1902). Where a confidential relationship
exists/ a presumption of unfairness arises which
must be overcome by countervailing evidence/ and
the burden shifts to the defendant to prove absence
of unfairness by a preponderance of the evidence.
Robertson v. Campbell/ Utah 674 P.2d 1226 (1983)
(finding of undue influence in execution of trust
shifted burden to defendant to prove absence of
undue influence in a subsequent alleged ratification
of the trust); Johnson v. Johnson/ 9 Utah 2d 40/
337 P.2d 420 (1959); In re Swan's Estate/ 4 Utah 2d
277, 293 P.2d 683 (19567T In all other relationships
the existence of a confidential relationship becomes
a question of fact. Blodgett v. Martsch/ supra.
The relationship between trustor and trustee in the case at

17

bar is that of brother and sister.

The question of whether

or

18
not this relationship gives rise to an inference of gift was
19
20

discussed by

this court in Matter of Estate of Hock/ 655 P.2d 1111

The court there also had the relationship of brother and sister

2 1 I before it and the decision was that this relationship did not
22 J give rise to an inference that a gift was intended.
3

, held:

This court

-18-

|
2
3 J
4 |
c I
° I
7 |
3 I
9

[9] Sections 442 and 443 of Restatement (Second) of
Trusts provide that if the transfer of property is
made to one person, the purchase price is paid by
another, and the transferee is a 'wife, child or other
natural object of bounty of the person by whom the
purchase price is paid,' a purchase money resulting
trust will not arise unless the one paying the purchase
price manifests an intention that the transferee should
not have the beneficial interest in the property.
Comment a. of Sec. 442 notes that this exception to
the resulting trust rule does not apply in the case
of brothers and sisters, aunts or uncles or nieces
or nephews where the payer does not stand in loco
parentis to the legal titleholder. We hold that
where the funds of a sibling are used to purchase
property and the legal title is held by another sibling,
the presumption of a resulting trust in favor of the
payer will arise as if no family relationship existed
between the parties.
Both in Ashton v. Ashton, supra, and in Hawkins v. Perry,

10
123 Utah 16, a party other than the original trustee claimed an
interest.
12
13

In both cases the interest was that of the wife of

the trustee.

In both cases this court held that the co-tenant

acquired no interest which would be independent of the trust in

14 I favor of the trustor unless it could be shown that the relation15 I ship of bona fide purchaser existed.
16
17

It is undisputed that defendant gave no consideration for
the interest that she got from Milton Hiltsley.
Hansen claim that they

Neither she nor

have paid any consideration for whatever

18
interests the documents create.
19
In Ashton v.
20

Ashton, supra, and Hawkins v. Perry, supra,

a confidential relationship was found to exist.

In Hawkins v.

2 1 Perry the trustee was the uncle of a minor child 16 years of age
22
23

and also a minister.
It is respectfully submitted that the undisputed facts and

-19-

Croft that a trust existed and that the assets of Wood were held

I

by Hiltsley in trust for her.

2

POINT III.
3 |
4 |

UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL, INTERVENOR SHOULD BE GRANTED
JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT AND THE
ITEMS AWARDED BY THE COURT DECISION
GRANTED TO HER.

Collateral estoppel has been the subject matter of numerous
6

decisions by this court.

In Searle Brothers v« Searle/ 588 P.2d

7 I 689 (1978)/ this court followed th lead of the California Supreme
3 i Court enunciated in Bernhard v* Bank of America National Trust &
I Savings Association/ 19 Cal.2d 807/

10

decision sets up four tests for

122 P.2d 892 (1942).

The

applying the doctrine of

collateral estoppel. They are:
1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication
12 |
identical with the one presented in the action in
question?

13
14 J

Was there a final judgment on the merits?
3.

Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a
party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication?

16

4.

Was the issue in the first case competently/ fully
and fairly litigated?

'' I

Since Searle/ the court has applied in a number of cases

15 J

18 I the doctrine of collateral estoppel without varying from the
19
20

standards set forth in Searle.

They are Wilde

v. Mid-Century

Insurance Company/ 635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981); Shaer v. State by
and Through Utah Department/ 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983); Penrod v.

21

Nu Creation Creme/ Inc./ 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983); Baxter v.
22

Department of Transportation/ 705 P.2d 1167 (Utah 1985).
23

-20-

The problem of application of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel which is not present in this case is mutuality of
parties.

Defendasnt had every opportunity to litigate all issues

in the matter of Hiltsley v. Ryder.

She was represented

by

extremely competent counsel, present counsel on this appeal, who
vigorously and diligently represented her through all the
6

litigation in the action.

7
8

9

A case which spells out carefully the use of the doctrine
of collateral estoppel is B.R. De Witt v. Albert Hall, 19 NY2d 141,
278NYS2d 596, 225 NE2d 195, 31 ALR3d 1035.
The New York Court of Appeals then recapped the development

10
in the doctrine of mutuality in the following language:
12 J

13
14 |
15 |

16
17|
18 |

19
20
21 |
22 |
23 |

To recapitulate, we are saying that the "doctrine of
mutuality" is a dead letter. While we have not
expressly so held, the trend of our decisions leads to
this conclusion (see 5 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Pracj
par 5011.42). This view finds support in other States
(Bernhard v. Bank of America, supra; Coca Cola Co. v.
Pepsi-Cola Co., 6 WW Harr 134, 36 Del 124, 172 A 260;
DePolo v. Greig, 338 Mich 703, 62 NW2d 441; Gammel v.
Ernst Sc Ernst, 245 Minn 249, 72 NW2d 364, 54 ALR2d 316;
Lustik v. Rankila, 269 Minn 515, 131 NW2d 741; Cantrell
v. Burnett & Henderson Co., 187 Tenn 552, 216 SW2d 307;
cf. First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Berkshire Life
Ins. Co., 176 Ohio St 395, 199 NE2d 863; see, also,
Ordway v. White, 14 AD2d 498, 217 NYS2d 334; but see
Reardon v. Allen, 88 NJ Super 560, 213 A2d 26) and
Federal courts (see, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co.,
327 F.2d 944 [2d Cir]; Graves v. Associated Transp.,
344 F2d 894 [4th Cir]; cf. Berner v. British CommonWealth Pacific Airlines, 346 F2d 532 [2d Cir.].
In this case, where the issues, as framed by the
pleadings, were no broader and no different than those
raided in the first lawsuit; where the defendant here
offers no reason for not holding him to the
determination in the first action; where it is
unquestioned (and probably unquestionable) that the
first action was defended with full vigor and

-21-

2 J
3 |
4 I

opportunity to be heard; and where the plaintiff in
the first action/ the operator of said vehicle/
although they do not technically stand in the
relationship of privity/ there is no reason either
in policy or precedent to hold that the judgment in
the Farnum case is not conclusive in the present action
(see Currie/ Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel/ 9 Stan
L Rev 281; Currie/ Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews/
53 Calif L Rev 25; Thornton/ Further Comment on
Collateral Estoppel/ 28 Brooklyn L Rev 250).
All of the criteria for application of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel are met in the present case.

Intervenor

submits that it is entitled to have judgment entered in accordance
with the judgment heretofore entered by the Honorable Bryant
9 I Croft on the 29th of March, 1983.
10
11 I
12

CONCLUSION
Intervenor/Appellant submits that the statute of limitations
does not bar

her recovery, that the facts and the cases decided

by this court show that a constructive trust was created between
13

Wood and Milton Hiltsley and the assets of Wood were traced
14

through Hiltsley to the defendant Ryder.
15
16

Intervenor further

submits that under the doctrine of collateral estoppel/ judgment
should be granted in her favor and against defendant

and the

17 I assets that Judge Croft traced through that came out of the Etta
18 I Wood property should be determined to be assets of the estate of
19 I Etta Wood.

Orders necessary to carry out this result should be

entered by the court.
20 |

RESPECTFULLY

SUBMITTED this

day of January, 1988.

21 "

22 |
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23
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